Its not as difficult as it first appears. It is very interesting. Broadly it allows for contradictions to be present in the same argument without being silly. Just like Human Beings. We are a mass of contradictions. We hold inconsistent beliefs.

I don’t believe in God and I don’t care if He [sic] is listening!

Ok here is the proof:

Thanks To Prof. Carl Vogel of TCD who started the ball rolling for me.

**THIS ARTICLE WAS COPIED FROM:*** http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/ Because I Am Learning Stuff and this is important!*

PLEASE CONTRIBUTE SOME MONEY IF YOU HAVE SOME, BY FOLLOWING THIS LINK, if you cant then buy a poor person a coffee and say good morning to a stranger, with a smile, everyday.

———————————————————————————-

# Paraconsistent Logic

*First published Tue Sep 24, 1996; substantive revision Fri Mar 20, 2009*

The contemporary logical orthodoxy has it that, from contradictory

premises, anything can be inferred. To be more precise, let ⊨ be

a relation of logical consequence, defined either semantically or

proof-theoretically. Call ⊨ *explosive* if it validates

{*A* , ¬*A*} ⊨ *B* for every *A*

and *B* (*ex contradictione quodlibet* (ECQ)). The

contemporary orthodoxy, i.e., classical logic, is explosive, but also

some ‘non-classical’ logics such as intuitionist logic and

most other standard logics are explosive.

The major motivation behind *paraconsistent logic* is to

challenge this orthodoxy. A logical consequence relation, ⊨, is

said to be *paraconsistent* if it is not explosive. Thus, if

⊨ is paraconsistent, then even if we are in certain

circumstances where the available information is inconsistent, the

inference relation does not explode into *triviality*. Thus,

paraconsistent logic accommodates inconsistency in a sensible manner

that treats inconsistent information as informative.

There are several reasons driving such motivation. The development of

the systems of paraconsistent logic has depended on these. The prefix

‘para’ in English has two meanings: ‘quasi’

(or ‘similar to, modelled on’) or

‘beyond’. When the term ‘paraconsistent’ was

coined by Miró Quesada at the Third Latin America Conference on

Mathematical Logic in 1976, he seems to have had the first meaning in

mind. Many paraconsistent logicians,

however, have taken it to mean the second, which provided different

reasons for the development of paraconsistent logic as we will see

below.

This article is not meant to be a complete survey of paraconsistent

logic. The modern history of paraconsistent logic maybe relatively

short. Yet the development of the field has grown to the extent that a

complete survey is impossible. The aim of this article is to provide

some aspects and features of the field that are philosophically

salient. This does not mean that paraconsistent logic has no

mathematical significance or significance in such areas as computer

science and linguistics. Indeed, the development of paraconsistent

logic in the last two decades or so indicates that it has important

applications in those areas. However, we shall tread over them lightly

and focus more on the aspects that are of interest for philosophers

and philosophically trained logicians.

- 1. Paraconsistency
- 2. Motivations
- 3. A Brief History of
*ex contradictione quodlibet* - 4. Modern History of Paraconsistent Logic
- 5. Systems of Paraconsistent Logic
- Bibliography
- Other Internet Resources
- Related Entries

## 1. Paraconsistency

A logic is said to be *paraconsistent* iff its logical

consequence relation is not explosive. Paraconsistency is thus a

property of a consequence relation and of a logic. In the literature,

especially in the part of it that contains objections to

paraconsistent logic, there has been some confusion over the

definition of paraconsistency. So before going any further, we make

one clarification.

Paraconsistency, so defined, is to do with the inference relation

{*A* , ¬*A*} ⊨ *B* for every *A*

and *B* (*ex contradictione quodlibet* (ECQ)).

Dialetheism,

on the other hand, is the view that there are true contradictions. If

dialetheism is to be taken as a view that does not entail everything,

then a dialehtiest’s preferred logic must better be

paraconsistent. For dialetheism is the view that *some*

contradiction is true and it does not amount to *trivialism*

which is the view that *everything*, including every

contradiction, is true.

Now, a paraconsistent logician may feel the force pulling them towards

dialetheism. Yet the view that a

consequence relation should be paraconsistent does not entail the view

that there *are* true contradictions. Paraconsistency is a

property of an inference relation whereas dialetheism is a view about

some sentences (or propositions, statements, utterances or whatever,

that can be thought of as truth-bearers). The fact that one can define

a non-explosive consequence relation does not mean that some sentences

are true. That is, the fact that one can construct a model where a

contradiction holds but not every sentence of the language holds (or,

if the model theory is given intensionally, where this is the case at

some world) does not mean that the contradiction is true *per
se*. Hence paraconsistency must be distinguished from dialetheism.

Moreover, as we will see below, many paraconsistent logics validate

the Law of Non-Contradiciton (LNC) (⊨ ¬(*A* ∧

¬*A*)) even though they invalidate ECQ. In a discussion of

paraconsistent logic, the primary focus is not the obtainability of

contradictions but the explosive nature of a consequence relation.

## 2. Motivations

The reasons for paraconsistency that have been put forward seem

specific to the development of the particular formal systems of

paraconsistent logic. However, there are several general reasons for

thinking that logic should be paraconsistent. Before we summarise the

systems of paraconsistent logic and their motivations, we present some

general motivations for paraconsisent logic.

### 2.1 Inconsistent but Non-Trivial Theories

A most telling reason for paraconsistent logic is the fact that there

are theories which are inconsistent but non-trivial. Once we admit the

existence of such theories, their underlying logics must be

paraconsistent. Examples of inconsistent but non-trivial theories are

easy to produce. An example can be derived from the history of

science. (In fact, many examples can be given from this area.)

Consider Bohr’s theory of the atom. According to this, an

electron orbits the nucleus of the atom without radiating

energy. However, according to Maxwell’s equations, which formed

an integral part of the theory, an electron which is accelerating in

orbit must radiate energy. Hence Bohr’s account of the behaviour

of the atom was inconsistent. Yet, patently, not everything concerning

the behavior of electrons was inferred from it, nor should it have

been. Hence, whatever inference mechanism it was that underlay it,

this must have been paraconsistent.

### 2.2 Dialetheias (True Contradictions)

Despite the fact that dialetheism and paraconsistency needs to be

distinguished, dialetheism can be a motivation for paraconsistent

logic. If there are true contradictions (dialetheias), i.e., there are

sentences, *A*, such that both *A* and ¬*A*

are true, then some inferences of the form {*A* ,

¬*A*} ⊨ *B* must fail. For only true, and not

arbitrary, conclusions follow validly from true premises. Hence logic

has to be paraconsistent. One candidate for a dialetheia is

the *liar paradox*. Consider the sentence: ‘This sentence

is not true’. There are two options: either the sentence is true

or it is not. Suppose it is true. Then what it says is the

case. Hence the sentence is not true. Suppose, on the other hand, it

is not true. This is what it says. Hence the sentence is true. In

either case it is both true and not true. (See the entry on

dialetheism

in this encyclopedia for further details.)

### 2.3 Automated Reasoning

Paraconsistent logic is motivated not only by philosophical

considerations, but also by its applications and implications. One of

the applications is *automated reasoning* (*information
processing*). Consider a computer which stores a large amount of

information. While the computer stores the information, it is also

used to operate on it, and, crucially, to infer from it. Now it is

quite common for the computer to contain inconsistent information,

because of mistakes by the data entry operators or because of multiple

sourcing. This is certainly a problem for database operations with

theorem-provers, and so has drawn much attention from computer

scientists. Techniques for removing inconsistent information have been

investigated. Yet all have limited applicability, and, in any case,

are not guaranteed to produce consistency. (There is no algorithm for

logical falsehood.) Hence, even if steps are taken to get rid of

contradictions when they are found, an underlying paraconsistent logic

is desirable if hidden contradictions are not to generate spurious

answers to queries.

### 2.4 Belief Revision

As a part of artificial intelligence research,

*belief revision*

is one of the areas that have been studied widely. Belief revision is

the study of rationally revising bodies of belief in the light of new

evidence. Notoriously, people have inconsistent beliefs. They may even

be rational in doing so. For example, there may be apparently

overwhelming evidence for both something and its negation. There may

even be cases where it is in principle impossible to eliminate such

inconsistency. For example, consider the ‘paradox of the

preface’. A rational person, after thorough research, writes a

book in which they

claim *A*_{1},…, *A*_{n}. But

they are also aware that no book of any complexity contains only

truths. So they rationally believe ¬(*A*_{1}

∧…∧ *A*_{n}) too. Hence,

principles of rational belief revision must work on inconsistent sets

of beliefs. Standard accounts of belief revision, e.g., that of

Gärdenfors *et al*., all fail to do this, since they are

based on classical logic. A more adequate account is based on a

paraconsistent logic.

### 2.5 Mathematical Significance

Another area of significance for paraconsistent logic concerns certain

mathematical theories. Examples of such theories are

formal *semantics*, *set theory*,

and *arithmetic*. The latter concerns *Gödel’s
Theorem*.

#### Formal Semantics and Set Theory

Semantics is the study that aims to spell out a theoretical

understanding of meaning. Most accounts of semantics insist that to

spell out the meaning of a sentence is, in some sense, to spell out

its truth-conditions. Now, *prima facie* at least, truth is a

predicate characterised by the Tarski T-scheme:

T() ↔AA

where *A* is a sentence and * A* is its

name. But given any standard means of self-reference, e.g.,

arithmetisation, one can construct a sentence,

*B*, which says

that ¬

*T*(

*). The T-scheme gives*

**B**that

*T*(

*) ↔*

**B**¬

*T*(

*). It then follows*

**B**that

*T*(

*) ∧*

**B**¬

*T*(

*). (This is, of course,*

**B**just the liar paradox.)

The situation is similar in set theory. The naive, and intuitively

correct, axioms of set theory are the *Comprehension Schema*

and *Extensionality Principle*:

∃

y∀x(x∈y

↔A)∀

x(x∈

y↔x∈z) →y = z

where *x* does not occur free in *A*. As was discovered

by Russell, any theory that contains the Comprehension Schema is

inconsistent. For putting ‘*y* ∉ *y*’

for *A* in the Comprehension Schema and instantiating the

existential quantifier to an arbitrary such object

‘*r*’ gives:

∀

y(y∈r↔y∉y)

So, instantiating the universal quantifier to ‘*r*’ gives:

r∈r↔r∉r

It then follows that *r* ∈ *r* ∧ *r* ∉ *r*.

The standard approaches to these problems of inconsistency are, by and

large, ones of expedience. However, a paraconsistent approach makes it

possible to have theories of truth and sethood in which the

mathematically fundamental intuitions about these notions are

respected. For example, as Brady (1989) has shown, contradictions may

be allowed to arise in a paraconsistent set theory, but these need not

infect the whole theory.

#### Arithmetic

Unlike formal semantics and set theory, there may not be any obvious

arithmetical principles that give rise to contradiction. Nonetheless,

just like the classical non-standard models of arithmetic, there is a

class of *inconsistent models of arithmetic* (or more

accurately *models of inconsistent arithmetic*) which have an

interesting and important mathematical structure.

One interesting implication of the existence of inconsistent models of

arithmetic is that some of them are finite (unlike the classical

non-standard models). This means that there are some significant

applications in the metamathematical theorems. For example, the

classical Löwenheim-Skolem theorem states that *Q*

(Robinson’s arithmetic which is a fragment of Peano arithmetic) has

models of every infinite cardinality but has no finite

models. But, *Q* can be shown to have models of finite size too

by referring to the inconsistent models of arithmetic.

#### Gödel’s Theorem

It is not only the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem but also other

metamathematical theorems can be given a paraconsistent treatment. In

the case of other theorems, however, the negative results that are

often shown by the limitative theorems of metamathematics may no

longer hold. One important such theorem is Gödel’s theorem.

One version of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem states

that for any consistent axiomatic theory of arithmetic, which can be

recognised to be sound, there will be an arithmetic truth – viz., its

Gödel sentence – not provable in it, but which can be established

as true by intuitively correct reasoning. The heart of

Gödel’s theorem is, in fact, a paradox that concerns the

sentence, *G*, ‘This sentence is not

provable’. If *G* is provable, then it is true and so not

provable. Thus *G* is proved. Hence *G* is true and so

unprovable. If an underlying paraconsistent logic is used to formalise

the arithmetic, and the theory therefore allowed to be inconsistent,

the Gödel sentence may well be provable in the theory

(essentially by the above reasoning). So a paraconsistent approach to

arithmetic overcomes the limitations of arithmetic that are supposed

(by many) to follow from Gödel’s theorem. (For other

‘limitative’ theorems of metamathematics, see Priest

2002.)

## 3. A Brief History of *ex contradictione quodlibet*

It is now standard to view *ex contradictione quodlibet* as a

valid form of inference. This contemporary view, however, should be

put in a historical perspective. It was towards the end of the 19th

century, when the study of logic achieved mathematical articulation,

that an explosive logical theory became the standard. With the work of

logicians such as Boole, Frege, Russell and Hilbert, classical logic

became the orthodox logical account.

In antiquity, however, no one seems to have endorsed the validity of

ECQ. Aristotle presented what is sometimes called the *connexive
principle*: “it is impossible that the same thing should be

necessitated by the being and by the not-being of the same

thing.” (

*Prior Analytic*II 4 57b3). (See the entry on

connexive logic

that has been developed based on this principle.) This principle

became a topic of debates in the Middle Ages or Medieval time. Though

the medieval debates seem to have been carried out in the context of

conditionals, we can also see it as debates about consequences. The

principle was taken up by

Boethius

(480–524 or 525) and

Abelard

(1079–1142), who considered two accounts of consequences. The

first one is a familiar one: it is impossible for the premises to be

true but conclusion false. The first account is thus similar to the

contemporary notion of truth-preservation. The second one is less

accepted recently: the sense of the premises contains that of the

conclusion. This account, as in relevant logics, does not permit an

inference whose conclusion is arbitrary. Abelard held that the first

account fails to meet the connexive principle and that the second

account (the account of containment) captured Aristotle’s principle.

Abelard’s position was shown to face a difficulty by Alberic of Paris

in the 1130s. Most medieval logicians didn’t, however, abandon

the account of validity based on containment or something

similar. (See, for example, Martin 1987.) But one way to handle the

difficulty is to reject the connexive principle. This approach, which

has become most influential, was accepted by the followers of Adam

Balsham or Parvipontanus (or sometimes known as Adam of The Little

Bridge) (12th CE). The Parvipontanians embraced the truth-preservation

account of consequences and the ‘paradoxes’ that are

associated with it. In fact, it was a member of the Parvipontanians,

William of Soissons, who discovered in the 12th century what we now

call the C.I. Lewis (independent) argument for ECQ. (See Martin 1986.)

The containment account, however, did not

disappear.

John Duns Scotus

(1266–1308) and his followers accepted the containment

account (see Martin 1996). The Cologne School of the late 15th

century argued against ECQ by rejecting *disjunctive
syllogism* (see Sylvan 2000).

Now, the history of logic in the ‘East’, or more

specifically Asia, is moot. There is a tendency, for example, in Jaina

and Buddhist traditions to consider the possibility of statements

being both true and false. Moreover, the logics developed by the major

Buddhist logicians, Dignāga (5th century) and Dharmakīrti

(7th century) do not embrace ECQ. Their logical account is, in fact,

based on the ‘pervasion’ (Skt: *vyāpti*,

Tib: *khyab pa*) relation among the elements of an

argument. Just like the containment account of Abelard, there must be

a tighter connection between the premises and conclusion than the

truth-preservation account allows. (For the logic of Dharmakīrti

and its subsequent development, see for example Dunne 2004 and

Tillemans 1999.)

## 4. Modern History of Paraconsistent Logic

In the 20th century, the idea of challenging the explosive orthodoxy

occurred to different people at different times and places

independently of each other. They were often motivated by different

considerations. The earliest paraconsistent logics in the contemporary

era seem to have been given by two Russians. Starting about 1910,

Vasil’év proposed a modified Aristotelian syllogistic

including statements of the form: *S* is both *P* and

not *P*. In 1929, Orlov gave the first axiomatisation of the

relevant logic *R* which is paraconsistent. (On

Vasil’év, see Arruda 1977 and Arruda 1989, pp. 102f. On Orlov, see Anderson, Belnap

and Dunn 1992, p. xvii.)

The work of Vasil’év or Orlov did not make any impact at

the time. The first (formal) logician to have developed paraconsistent

logic was the Polish logician, Jaśkowski, who was a student of

Łukasiewicz, who envisaged paraconsistent logic in his critique

of Aristotle on LNC (Łukasiewicz 1951).

Paraconsistent logics were also developed in South America by Asenjo

(1954) and da Costa (1963) in their doctoral dissertations. Since

then, an active group of logicians has been working on paraconsistent

logic in Brazil, especially in Campinas and in São Paulo.

Paraconsistent logics in the forms of relevant logics were proposed in

England by Smiley in 1959 and also at about the same time, in a much

more developed form, in the USA by Anderson and Belnap. An active

group of relevant logicians grew up in Pittsburgh including Dunn and

Meyer. The development of paraconsistent logics (in the form of

relevant logics) was transported to Australia. R. Routley (later

Sylvan) and V. Routley (later Plumwood) discovered an intentional

semantics for some of Anderson/Belnap relevant logics. A school

developed around them in Canberra which included Brady and Mortensen,

and later Priest who, together with R. Routley, incorporated

dialetheism to the development.

By the mid-1970s, the development of paraconsistent logic became

international. In Belgium, a group of logicians around Batens in Ghent

grew up and remains active. Paraconsistent logic is also actively

investigated in Canada by Jennings, Schotch and their student

Brown. In 1997, the

First World Congress on Paraconsistency

was held at the University of Ghent in Belgium. The

Second World Congress

was held in São Sebastião (São Paulo, Brazil) in

2000, the

Third

in Toulous (France) in 2003 and the

Fourth

in Melbourne (Australia) in 2008. We now see logicians

working on paraconsistent logic in Bulgaria, China, France, Germany,

Italy, Japan, New Zealand to name just a few.

## 5. Systems of Paraconsistent Logic

A number of formal techniques to invalidate ECQ have been

devised. Most of the techniques have been summarised elsewhere, for

example Brown 2002 and Priest 2002. As

the interest in paraconsistent logic grew, different techniques

developed in different parts of the world. As a result, the

development of the techniques has somewhat a regional flavour (though

there are, of course, exceptions, and the regional differences can be

over-exagerated). (See Tanaka 2003.)

Most paraconsistent logicians do not propose a wholesale rejection of

classical logic. They usually accept the validity of classical

inferences in consistent contexts. It is the need to isolate an

inconsistency without spreading everywhere that motivates the

rejection of ECQ. Depending on how much revision one thinks is needed,

we have a technique for paraconsistency. The taxonomy given here is

based on the degree of revision to classical logic. Since the logical

novelty can be seen at the propositional level, we will concentrate on

the propositional paraconsistent logics.

### 5.1 Discussive Logic

The first formal paraconsistent logic to have been developed

was *discussive* (or *discursive*) *logic* by the

Polish logician Jaśkowski (1948). The thought behind discussive

logic is that, in a discourse, each participant puts forward some

information, beliefs or opinions. Each assertion is true according to

the participant who puts it forward in a discourse. But what is true

in a discourse on whole is the sum of assertions put forward by

participants. Each participant’s opinions may be self-consistent, yet

may be inconsistent with those of others. Jaśkowski formalised

this idea in the form of discussive logic.

A formalisation of discussive logic is by means of modelling a

discourse in a modal logic. For simplicity, Jaśkowski

chose *S5*. We think of each participant’s belief set as the

set of sentences true at a world in a *S5*

model *M*. Thus, a sentence *A* asserted by a

participant in a discourse is interpreted as “it is possible

that *A*” (◊*A*). That is, a

sentence *A* of discussive logic can be translated into a

sentence ◊*A* of *S5*. Then *A* holds in a

discourse iff *A* is true at some world

in *M*. Since *A* may hold in one world but not in

another, both *A* and ¬*A* may hold in a

discourse. Indeed, one should expect that participants disagree on

some issue in a rational discourse.

To be more precise, let *d* be a translation function from a

formula of discussive logic into a formula of *S5*. Then

(*p*)^{d} = ◊*p*. For complex

formulas

(¬

A)^{d}=

¬(A^{d})(

A∨B)^{d}=

A^{d}∨B^{d}(

A∧B)^{d}=

A^{d}∧B^{d}(

A⊃B)^{d}=

A^{d}⊃B^{d}(

A≡B)^{d}=

A^{d}≡B^{d}

It is easy to show that *B* is a discussive consequence

of *A*_{1}, …, *A*_{n} iff

the formula ◊*A*_{1}^{d} ⊃

(… ⊃ (◊*A*_{n}^{d}

⊃ ◊*B*^{d})…) is a theorem

of *S5*.

To see that discussive logic is paraconsistent, consider a *S5*

model, *M*, such that *A* holds

at *w _{1}*,

*¬A*holds at a different

world

*w*but

_{2}*B*does not hold at any world

for some

*B*. Then both

*A*and ¬

*A*hold,

yet

*B*does not hold in

*M*. Hence discussive logic

invalidates ECQ.

However, there is no *S5* model where *A* ∧

¬*A* holds at some world. So an inference of the form

{*A * ∧ ¬*A*} ⊨ *B* is valid in

discussive logic. This means that, in discussive

logic, *adjunction* ({*A*, ¬*A*}

⊨ *A* ∧ ¬*A*) fails. But one can define a discussive conjunction, ∧_{d},

as *A* ∧ ◊*B* (or ◊*A*

∧ *B*). Then adjunction holds for

∧_{d} (Jaśkowski 1949).

One difficulty is a formulation of a conditional. In *S5*, the

inference from ◊*p* and ◊(*p* ⊃ *q*)

to ◊*q* fails. Jaśkowski chose to introduce a

connective which he called *discussive implication*,

⊃_{d}, defined as ◊*A* ⊃ *B*. This

connective can be understood to mean that “if some participant

states that *A*, then *B*”. As the inference from

◊*A* ⊃ *B* and ◊*A* to

◊*B* is valid in *S5*, *modus ponens* for

⊃_{d} holds in discussive logic. A discussive

bi-implication, ≡_{d}, can also be defined as

(◊*A* ⊃ *B*) ∧ ◊(◊*A*

⊃ *B*) (or ◊(◊*A* ⊃ *B*) ∧

(◊*A* ⊃ *B*)).

### 5.2 Non-Adjunctive Systems

A non-adjunctive system is a system that does not validate adjunction

(i.e., {*A*, *B*} ⊭ *A*

∧ *B*). As we saw above, discussive logic without a

discussive conjunction is non-adjunctive. Another non-adjunctive

strategy was suggested by Rescher and Manor 1970-71. In effect, we

can conjoin premises, but only up to maximal

consistency. Specifically, if Σ is a set of premises, a

maximally consistent subset is any consistent subset Σ′

such that if *A* ∈ Σ − Σ′ then

Σ′ ∪ {*A*} is inconsistent. Then we say

that *A* is a consequence of Σ iff *A* is a

classical consequence of Σ′ for some maximally consistent

subset Σ′. Then {*p*, *q*}

⊨ *p* ∧ *q* but {*p*, ¬*p*}

⊭ *p* ∧ ¬*p*.

### 5.3 Preservationism

In the non-adjunctive system of Rescher and Manor, a consequence

relation is defined over some maximally consistent subset of the

premises. This can be seen as a way to ‘measure’

the *level* of consistency in the premise set. The level of

{*p*, *q*} is 1 since the maximally consistent subset is

the set itself. The level of {*p*, ¬*p*}, however,

is 2: {*p*} and {¬*p*}.

If we define a consequence relation over some maximally consistent

subset, then the relation can be thought of as preserving the level of

consistent fragments. This is the approach which has come to be

called *preservationism*. It was first developed by the

Canadian logicians Ray Jennings and Peter Scotch.

To be more precise, a (finite) set of formulas, Σ, can be

partitioned into classically consistent fragments whose union is

Σ. Let ⊢ be the classical consequence

relation. A *covering* of Σ is a set

{Σ_{i} : *i* ∈ *I*}, where

each member is consistent, and Σ

= ∪_{i ∈ I}

Σ_{i}. The *level* of

Σ, *l*(Σ), is the least *n* such that

Σ can be partitioned into *n* sets if there is

such *n*, or ∞ if there is no such *n*. A

consequence relation, called *forcing*, [⊢, is defined as

follows. Σ [⊢ *A* iff *l*(Σ) =

∞, or *l*(Σ) = *n* and for every covering of%0

antics.

The semantics for relevant logics were developed by Fine (1974), Routley and Routley (1972), Routley and Meyer (1993) and Urquhart (1972). (There are also algebraic semantics. See for example Dunn and Restall 2002, pp. 48ff.) In the Routleys-Meyer semantics, based on possible-world semantics (which is the most studied semantics for relevant logics, especially in Australia), conjunction and disjunction behave in the usual way. But each world, *w*, has an associate world, *w**, and negation is evaluated in terms of *w**: ¬*A* is true at *w* iff *A* is false, not at *w*, but at *w**. Thus, if *A* is true at *w*, but false at *w**, then *A* ∧ ¬*A* is true at *w*. To obtain the standard relevant logics, one needs to add the constraint that *w*** = *w*. As is clear, negation in these semantics is an intensional operator.

The primary concern with relevant logics is not so much with negation as with a conditional connective → (satisfying *modus ponens*). In relevant logics, if *A* → *B* is a logical truth, then *A* is relevant to *B*, in the sense that *A* and *B* share at least one propositional variable.

Semantics for the relevant conditional are obtained by furnishing each Routleys-Meyer model with a *ternary* relation. In the simplified semantics of Priest and Sylvan 1992 and Restall 1993 and 1995, worlds are divided into normal and non-normal. If *w* is a normal world, *A* → *B* is true at *w* iff at all worlds where *A* is true, *B* is true. If *w* is non-normal, *A* → *B* is true at *w* iff for all *x*, *y*, such that *Rwxy*, if *A* is true at *x*, *B* is true at *y*. If *B* is true at *x* but not at *y* where *Rwxy*, then *B* → *B* is not true at *w*. Then one can show that *A* → (*B* → *B*) is not a logical truth. (Validity is defined as truth preservation over *normal* worlds.) This gives the basic relevant logic, *B*. Stronger logics, such as the logic *R*, are obtained by adding constraints on the ternary relation.

There are also versions of world-semantics for relevant logics based on Dunn’s relational semantics for *FDE*. Then negation is extensional. A conditional connective, now needs to be given both truth and falsity conditions. So we have: *A* → *B* is true at *w* iff for all *x*, *y*, such that *Rwxy*, if *A* is true at *x*, *B* is true at *y*; and *A* → *B* is false at *w* iff for some *x*, *y*, such that *Rwxy*, if *A* is true at *x*, *B* is false at *y*. Adding various constraints on the ternary relation provides stronger logics. However, these logics are not the standard relevant logics developed by Anderson and Belnap. To obtain the standard family of relevant logics, one needs neighbourhood frames. (See Mares 2004.) Further details concerning relevant logics can be found in the article on that topic in this encyclopedia.

## Bibliography

### For Paraconsistency in general:

- Priest, G., Routley, R., and Norman, J. (eds.) (1989).
*Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent*, München: Philosophia Verlag. - Priest, G. (2002). “Paraconsistent Logic”,
*Handbook of Philosophical Logic*(Second Edition), Vol. 6, D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 287-393.

### For Inconsistent but Non-Trivial Theories

- Brown, B. and G. Priest. (2004). “Chunk and Permeate: A Paraconsistent Inference Strategy. Part 1: The Infinitesimal Calculus”,
*Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 33: 379-388.

### On Dialetheism

- Priest, G. (1987).
*In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff; second edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. - Priest, G., J.C. Beall and B. Armour-Garb (eds.) (2004).
*The Law of Non-Contradiction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

### For Automated Reasoning

- Belnap, N.D., Jr. (1992). “A Useful Four-valued Logic: How a computer should think”,
*Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity*, Volume II, A.R. Anderson, N.D. Belnap, Jr, and J.M. Dunn, Princeton: Princeton University Press; first appeared as “A Usuful Four-valued Logic”,*Modern Use of Multiple-valued Logic*, J.M. Dunn and G. Epstein (eds.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1977, and “How a Computer Should Think”,*Comtemporary Aspects of Philosophy*, G. Ryle (ed.), Oriel Press, 1977. - Besnard, P. and Hunter, A. (eds.) (1998).
*Handbook of Deasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems*, Volume 2,*Reasoning with Actual and Potential Contradictions*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

### For Belief Revision

- Priest, G. (2001). “Paraconsistent Belief Revision”,
*Theoria*, 67: 214-228. - Restall, G. and Slaney, J. (1995). “Realistic Belief Revision”,
*Proceedings of the Second World Conference in the Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence*, M. De Glas and Z. Pawlak (eds.), Paris: Angkor, pp. 367-378. - Tanaka, K. (2005). “The AGM Theory and Inconsistent Belief Change”,
*Logique et Analyse*, 48: 113-150.

### For Mathematical Significance

- Brady, R.T. (1989). “The Non-Triviality of Dialectical Set Theory”,
*Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent*, G. Priest, R. Routley and J. Norman (eds.), München: Philosophia Verlag, pp. 437-471. - Mortensen, C. (1995).
*Inconsistent Mathematics*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. - Priest, G. (2003). “Inconsistent Arithmetic: Issues Technical and Philosophical”, in
*Trends in Logic: 50 Years of Studia Logica*(Studia Logica Library, Volume 21), V. F. Hendricks and J. Malinowski (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 273-99.

### For a History of *ex contradictione quodlibet*

- Sylvan, R. (2000). “A Preliminary Western History of Sociative Logics”,
*Sociative Logics and Their Applications: Essays by the late Richard Sylvan*, D. Hyde and G. Priest (eds.), Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers.

### For Modern History of Paraconsistent Logic

- Arruda, A. (1989). “Aspects of the Historical Development of Paraconsistent Logic”,
*Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent*, G. Priest, R. Routley and J. Norman (eds.), München: Philosophia Verlag, pp. 99-130. - Priest, G. (2007). “Paraconsistency and Dialetheism”, in
*Handbook of the History of Logic*, Volume 8, D. Gabbay and J. Woods (eds.), Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 129-204.

### For the Systems of Paraconsistent Logic in general

- Brown, B. (2002). “On Paraconsistency”, in
*A Companion to Philosophical Logic*, Dale Jacquette (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 628-650.

### For Discussive Logic

- Jaśkowski, S. (1948). “Rachunek zdań dla systemów dedukcyjnych sprzecznych”,
*Studia Societatis Scientiarun Torunesis*(Sectio A), 1 (5): 55-77; an English translation appeared as “Propositional Calculus for Contradictory Deductive Systems”,*Studia Logica*, 24 (1969): 143-157. - Jaśkowski, S. (1949). “O koniunkcji dyskusyjnej w rachunku zdań dla systemów dedukcyjnych sprzecznych”,
*Studia Societatis Scientiarum Torunensis*(Sectio A), 1 (8): 171-172; an English translation appeared as “On the Discussive Conjunction in the Propositional Calculus for Inconsistent Deductive Systems”,*Logic and Logical Philosophy*, 7 (1999): 57-59. - da Costa, N.C.A. and Dubikajtis, L. (1977). “On Jaśkowski’s Discussive Logic”, in
*Non-Classical Logics, Modal Theory and Computability*, A.I. Arruda, N.C.A. da Costa and R. Chuaqui (eds.), Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, pp. 37-56.

### For Non-Adjunctive Systems

- Rescher, N. and R. Manor (1970-71). “On Inference from Inconsistent Premises”,
*Theory and Decision*, 1: 179-217.

### For Preservationism

- Schotch, P.K. and R.E. Jennings (1980). “Inference and Necessity”,
*Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 9: 327-340.

### For Adaptive Logics

- Batens, D. (2001). “A General Characterization of Adaptive Logics”,
*Logique et Analyse*, 173-175: 45-68. - Batens, D. (2007). “A Universal Logic Approach to Adaptive Logics”,
*Logica Universalis*, 1: 221-242.

### For Logics of Formal Inconsistency

- Carnielli, W.A., M.E. Coniglio and J. Marcos (2007). “Logics of Formal Inconsistency”,
*Handbook of Philosophical Logic*, Volume 14 (Second Edition), D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), Berlin: Springer, pp. 15-107. - da Costa, N.C.A. (1974). “On the Theory of Inconsistent Formal Systems”,
*Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 15 (4): 497-510.

### For Many-Valued Logics

- Asenjo, F.G. (1966). “A Calculus of Antinomies”,
*Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 7: 103-5. - Dunn, J.M. (1976). “Intuitive Semantics for First Degree Entailment and Coupled Trees”,
*Philosophicl Studies*, 29: 149-68. - Priest, G. (1979). “Logic of Paradox”,
*Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 8: 219-241.

### For Relevant Logics

- Anderson, A. and N. Belnap. (1975).
*Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity*, Volume 1, Princeton: Princeton University Press. - Anderson, A., N. Belnap and J.M. Dunn. (1992).
*Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity*, Volume 2, Princeton: Princeton University Press. - Dunn, J.M. and G. Restall (2002). “Relevance Logic”,
*Handbook of Philosophical Logic*, Volume 6, second edition, D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 1-136. - Routley, R., Plumwood, V., Meyer, R.K., and Brady, R.T. (1982).
*Relevant Logics and Their Rivals*, Volume 1, Ridgeview: Atascadero. - Brady, R.T. (ed.) (2003).
*Relevant Logics and Their Rivals*, Volume 2, Aldershot: Ashgate.

### Other Works Cited

- Arruda, A. (1977). “On the Imaginary Logic of N.A. Vasil’év”, in
*Non-Classicl Logic, Model Theory and Cpmputability*, A. Arruda, N, da Costa and R. Chuanqui (eds.), Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 3-24. - da Costa, N.C.A. and E.H. Alves (1977). “Semantical Analysis of the Calculi Cn”,
*Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 18 (4): 621-630. - Dunne, J.D. (2004).
*Foundations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy*, Boston: Wisdom Publications. - Fine, K. (1974). “Models for Entailment”,
*Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 3: 347-372. - Loparic, A. (1977). “Une etude semantique de quelques calculs propositionnels”,
*Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires des Seances de l’Academie des Sciences*, 284: 835-838. - Łukasiewicz, J. (1951).
*Atistotle’s Syllogistic: From the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. - Mares, E. (2004). “‘Four-Valued’ Semantics for the Relevant Logic R”,
*Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 33: 327-341. - Martin, C. (1986). “William’s Machine”,
*Journal of Philosophy*, 83: 564-572. - Martin, C. (1987). “Embarrassing Arguments and Surprising Conclusions in the Development Theories of the Conditional in the Twelfth Century”,
*Gilbert De Poitiers Et Ses Contemporains*, J. Jolivet, A. De Libera (eds.), Naples: Bibliopolis, pp. 377-401. - Martin, C. (1996). “Impossible Positio as the Foundation of Metaphysics or, Logic on the Scotist Plan?”,
*Vestigia, Imagines, Verba: Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts*, C. Marmo (ed.), Turnhout: Brepols, pp. 255-276. - Priest, G. and R. Sylvan (1992). “Simplified Semantics for Basic Relevant Logics”,
*Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 21: 217-232. - Restall, G. (1993). “Simplified Semantics for Relevant Logics (and some of their rivals)”,
*Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 22: 481-511. - Restall, G. (1995). “Four-Valued Semantics for Relevant Logics (and some of their rivals)”,
*Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 24: 139-160. - Routley, R. and R. Meyer (1993). “Semantics of Entailment”,
*Truth, Syntax and Modality*, H. Leblanc (ed.), Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 194-243. - Routley, R. and V. Routley (1972). “Semantics of First Degree Entailment”,
*Noûs*, 3: 335-359. - Tanaka, K. (2003). “Three Schools of Paraconsistency”,
*The Australasian Journal of Logic*, 1: 28-42. - Tillemans, Tom J.F. (1999).
*Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakīrti and His Tibetan Successors*, Boston: Wisdom Publications. - Urquhart, A. (1972). “Semantics for Relevant Logics”,
*Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 37: 159-169.